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Introduction 
 
Due to its small size, lack of natural resources and geographical position in the middle of the 
Mediterranean Sea, the Maltese economy has always been very reliant on international trade 
and investment flows
2
.  Prior to independence, this dependence centred on revenues from the 
British military naval base.  The gaining of political sovereignty in 1964 led to the successful 
restructuring of Malta from a fortress economy to a well-diversified manufacturing and 
tourism centre
3
.  Starting in the late 1980s, the role of the public sector began to be rolled 
back, trade barriers were steadily removed and many sectors of the economy were liberalised.  
Thus, in 1994, the Central Bank of Malta (CBM) was granted operational independence from 
the Ministry of Finance and given complete autonomy as regards the formulation and 
implementation of monetary policy.  Subsequently, in view of Malta’s accession to the 
European Union (EU) in May 2004, the Central Bank of Malta Act was amended further so 
that price stability was established as the Bank’s primary objective4.  The CBM pursues this 
aim by using a fixed exchange rate as its intermediate target or nominal anchor
5
.   
 
A Successful Fixed Exchange Rate Regime  
 
When the CBM was established in 1968, the Maltese currency, the lira was fixed at par with 
sterling.  The floating of sterling after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system prompted the 
Maltese authorities to break this direct link and, instead, peg the lira to a trade-weighted 
basket of currencies, which included sterling and the major European currencies.  In this way, 
the Maltese lira was insulated from external pressures arising from a binding relationship with 
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2
 In 2002 exports and imports amounted to 174% of the gross domestic product (GDP).  The latter 
stood at approximately $3.9 billion. 
3
 Market services, including tourism, account for nearly two-fifths of GDP, while manufacturing, 
which is mainly export-oriented, contributes almost a quarter.  GDP per capita stands at nearly $9,200. 
4
 The original objectives of the CBM were “to promote the orderly and balanced development of Malta 
and a rising level of employment and income consistent with the maintenance of monetary policy 
stability in Malta and the external value of the currency”.  The amended Act also individuated other 
roles such as financial stability, the payment system and financial statistics.  See CBM (2002).  
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 The Minister of Finance, however, may adjust the exchange rate, after consulting the Bank and upon 
the consent of the Prime Minister. 
a single foreign currency.  This original basket was afterwards modified to include the US 
dollar, in order to dampen the effects of the first oil price shock.  Several alterations were 
made in the late 1970s and early 1980s in light of the establishment of the European Monetary 
System (EMS) and the second oil price shock.  During this period the main emphasis was on 
combating imported inflation by favouring hard currencies in the basket.  The subsiding of 
inflationary pressures, together with a spike in unemployment, prompted the removal of this 
bias, so to reinvigorate export competitiveness.  In 1985 and 1987 the weighting scheme was 
revised to also reflect trade in services.  Two years later, the number of component currencies 
was reduced to three, as the European Currency Unit (ECU) was included instead of the 
individual EU currencies.  No further changes were effected in the following decade, until the 
advent of European Monetary Union (EMU) led to the replacement of ECU by the euro.  In 
2002, the weight of the euro was boosted from 56% to 70%, in view of deepening trade 
relationships.  The weights of the dollar and sterling were set at 10% and 20%, respectively. 
  
The adoption of a fixed exchange rate system implies that monetary authorities are prepared 
to forgo completely the use of monetary policy for stabilisation purposes
6
, unless they set up 
rigorous capital controls.  Liberalised capital flows emasculate any autonomous interest rate 
policy, as investors react to changes in the interest rate differential and through their actions 
force a readjustment of the domestic nominal interest rate back to its original position
7
.   
 
Maintaining a credible exchange rate peg is inherently difficult, as the speculative attacks that 
hit the EMS, Latin America and Asia in the 1990s attest.  Yet, Malta is one of the few 
countries to have successfully operated a fixed exchange rate regime since its inception.  The 
lira was, in fact, devalued only once in 1992.  This impressive track record may in part be 
explained by the presence of capital controls, which were gradually removed only recently, 
and the associated imperfect substitutability of Maltese for foreign financial assets
8
.  Thus 
during the 1970s and 1980s, the strict enforcement of controls may have allowed the 
authorities to maintain very low domestic interest rates in order to aid industrialisation, while 
building up credibility and reserves.  The effectiveness and comprehensiveness of capital 
controls, however, diminished progressively, as Government pursued trade and financial 
sector liberalisation in the 1990s.  In fact, in 2002, foreign financial holdings to the tune of 
17% of GDP were registered by taxpayers following a special Government scheme.  
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 The CBM, thus, monitors closely this differential so that it always incorporates an appropriate risk 
premium. 
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Consequently, capital account liberalisation
9
 was not seen as posing any threat to the Bank’s 
capability to continue defending the external value of the lira.   
 
The regime is now, in fact, backed by a healthy stock of reserves
10
, which are legally required 
to cover at least 60% of base money.  More importantly the credibility of the peg is buttressed 
by a three-decade long track record during which political and monetary authorities have 
agreed on the primacy of the fixed rate commitment.  Under various administrations, both the 
Minister of Finance and the CBM Governor have repeatedly stressed that devaluation is a 
rather ineffective policy, in that it imposes “immediate costs and leaves no long-term 
benefits” 11.  As a result, visiting International Monetary Fund (IMF) missions have always 
concurred with the retention of the pegged regime
12
.             
 
The Rationale behind the Exchange Rate Peg 
 
In a speech in 1997, the then CBM Governor, Mr. E. Ellul, had explained why the Bank has 
always considered “some form of fixed exchange rate to be the most suitable arrangement for 
Malta” and effectively agreed to “accept to have its hands tied in this way”.  First of all “the 
exchange rate peg reduces exchange rate volatility and thus contributes positively to foreign 
trade and investment”, a particularly important consideration for “a small, open economy with 
relatively underdeveloped financial markets” like Malta.  Secondly this arrangement “may 
serve to instil greater discipline in the operation of monetary and fiscal policies”, thereby 
helping “in achieving long-term economic goals”.  Finally, the Governor had stressed that the 
peg “is one manner of ensuring that inflation in Malta does not diverge significantly from 
inflation abroad so that Malta’s export competitiveness is maintained”.    
 
Malta’s dependence on imports of consumer goods implies that inflation in trading partners 
plays an important part in domestic price dynamics.  Furthermore, even domestically 
produced goods are to a large extent affected by foreign inflation, as most raw materials and 
capital goods are imported.  As a result, core inflation tends to mirror movements in imported 
inflation
13.  By pegging the lira to a basket of stable currencies belonging to Malta’s main 
trading partners, exchange rate movements are prevented from boosting imported inflationary 
pressures.  In this regard the peg arrangement has served the country well.  With the exception 
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of the oil price shock of the early 1980s, inflation has remained low throughout the post 
independence period.  Over the past five years, it has averaged 2.4%, never departing from 
the basket-weighted foreign inflation rate by more than 0.8 of a percentage point.  
 
The Monetary Policy Advisory Council (MPAC) 
 
The MPAC, which meets every month, is responsible to advise the Governor on matters 
relating to monetary policy.  However, the responsibility for taking decisions is vested in the 
Governor alone.   
 
Usually the meeting starts with a review of the effects on financial markets of the decision 
taken in the previous MPAC.  The latest financial market trends are then looked into, in order 
to detect any market expectations.  Thereafter the Council proceeds to analyse local and 
international economic developments and forecasts.  Given the nature of the intermediate 
target, economic analysis focuses on the individuation of current and potential pressures on 
the exchange rate.  These are primarily reflected by movements in foreign currency reserves 
and the interest rate premium.  International developments play a very important part in the 
determination of these movements.  Hence the performance of Malta’s main trading partners 
is monitored extensively.  Malta’s balance of payment transactions, due to the openness of the 
economy, are studied in detail, focusing on merchandise trade, tourism and capital flows.  The 
CBM has also constructed CPI-based NEER and REER indices to appraise the economy’s 
competitiveness.  Turning to the domestic sector, the MPAC assesses the state of aggregate 
demand, on account of the substantial import content of consumption.  Credit growth and 
fiscal developments are given close attention in this regard.  Labour market activity is also 
reviewed so as to determine pressures on labour costs.  The Council looks at price 
developments, including movements in house prices.  On a regular basis the MPAC is also 
given economic forecasts derived from the Bank’s structural model, together with business 
sentiment assessments from a survey carried out amongst major economic operators.          
 
Conclusion 
 
Following EU accession, Malta will eventually adopt the euro.  This should benefit the 
Maltese economy as “from a monetary policy point of view, the surest way to overcome the 
disadvantages of small economic size is to adhere to a larger currency area
14”.  EMU 
participation will eliminate currency conversion costs and exchange rate risk.  Greater price 
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transparency could also induce more competition and lower inflation.  The adoption of the 
euro, in essence, will consolidate the present exchange rate arrangement and monetary policy 
framework, whilst removing the need to maintain a large stock of reserves to safeguard 
against speculative attacks. 
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